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Abstract
In this work we present a quantum key distribution protocol using continuous-variable non-
Gaussian states, homodyne detection and post-selection. The employed signal states are the Photon
Added then Subtracted Coherent States (PASCS) in which one photon is added and subsequently
one photon is subtracted. We analyze the performance of our protocol, compared to a coherent state
based protocol, for two different attacks that could be carried out by the eavesdropper (Eve). We
calculate the secret key rate transmission in a lossy line for a superior channel (beam-splitter) attack,
and we show that we may increase the secret key generation rate by using the non-Gaussian PASCS
rather than coherent states. We also consider the simultaneous quadrature measurement (intercept-
resend) attack and we show that the efficiency of Eve’s attack is substantially reduced if PASCS are
used as signal states.
1 Introduction
The first quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, conceived in 1984 (BB84) [1], is an inherently discrete
protocol; it not only requires (discrete) single photon sources, but the modulation of the signals is also
discrete. Although the ideal BB84 has been proved unconditionally secure [2, 3], there are still practical
shortcomings: reliable single photon sources (used by Alice, the sender) are hard to build, and photon
counters (used by Bob, the receiver) limit the key generation rate. Notwithstanding fully discrete-variable
protocols have been successfully accomplished over distances of more than 250 km in ultra low loss fibres
[4]. Meanwhile, several alternative QKD protocols using other (continuous-variable) light sources have
been proposed - employing, for instance, squeezed states [5, 6, 7, 8] or coherent states [5, 9, 10, 11].
In such continuous-variable protocols, the key may be encoded by Alice in the quadrature variables,
and Bob will be allowed to employ photomultipliers (which are faster than single photon detectors)
to read the signals via homodyne detection. Continuous-variable protocols may be classified as: i) all
continuous protocols [9, 10], for which Alice prepares, for instance, Gaussian states such as coherent
states, with random amplitudes drawn from a continuous Gaussian distribution, or ii) hybrid protocols
[8, 12, 13, 14]. In the hybrid protocols Alice uses light prepared in continuous-variable light signals, but
the encoding is made using a discrete set of states (e.g., four states). At the same time we are witnessing
considerable advances concerning the implementation of QKD in real-world conditions [15, 16] which
usually requires long-distance communication. The all continuous-variable protocols are mostly based on
coherent states, which are easier to generate than other quantum states of light. However, coherent state
based protocols are normally more effective in shorter ranges, due to poor performance in low signal-to-
noise ratio conditions. Recently, though, a record of 80 km has been established for an improved version
[17] of the GG02 continuous-variable protocol [9]. In spite of those advances, it would be interesting to
seek other possibilities for long-distance QKD. A viable alternative are the hybrid continuous/discrete
protocols, which may employ either Gaussian or non-Gaussian states. We would like to remark that
continuous-variable non-Gaussian states (contrary to Gaussian states) may allow the use of quantum
repeaters in order to increase the transmission range of a practical QKD system [18].
In this paper, we propose a protocol for QKD based on continuous-variable non-Gaussian
states, viz., photon added then subtracted coherent states (PASCS). The PASCS may be generated in a
relatively straightforward way departing from a Gaussian (coherent) state [20]. We may then formulate a
protocol similar to already existing continuous-variable protocols [8, 13] employing homodyne detection
and post-selection [19]. We encode bits 0 and 1 in two pairs of PASCS (each pair containing states with
opposite phases), which are randomly prepared by Alice. Alice sends light signals to Bob through a
lossy line, who will perform homodyne detections on them. In order to demonstrate the robustness of
our protocol against eavesdropping, we calculate the transmitted secret bit rate, (SAB) [21] for a beam
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splitter attack (superior channel attack), as well as for a kind of intercept-resend attack (simultaneous
measurement quadrature attack). That analysis will allow us to assess the security of the protocol using
two different attacks as well as to establish a comparison with the performance of other protocols. Our
paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we briefly introduce the PASCS. In Section 3, we review
the basic structure of the protocol. In Section 4, we analyze the performance of our protocol under the
superior channel attack: we calculate the secret key rate of our protocol and compare the results with
those obtained using a similar protocol using coherent states. In Section 5 we consider a intercept-resend
attack: the simultaneous measurement quadrature attack. We evaluate the eavesdropper success rate for
both the PASCS and the coherent states. In Section 6, we discuss the results and present our conclusions.
2 Photon Added then Subtracted Coherent States
It is possible to perform quantum state engineering, via conditional measurements by adding and/or
subtracting photons of a quantized light field, as discussed in [22]. Earlier in the nineties there were
envisaged the photon added coherent states (PACS) [23], which were successfully generated a few years
ago [24]. Subsequently, the combination of photon adding and photon subtracting in the electromagnetic
field has also been experimentally explored [20]. In general, the operation of firstly adding k photons and
then subtracting l photons from a coherent state |α〉 results in the following state (PASCS) [25]:
|k, l, α〉 = [Nk,l(α)]−1/2aˆlaˆ†k|α〉, (1)
with normalizing constant
Nk,l(α) =
l∑
m=0
(l!)2(l + k −m)!
(−1)mm!((l −m)!)2Ll+k−m
(−|α|2) , (2)
and where Ll+k−m
(−|α|2) is the Laguerre polynomial of order (l + k −m).
Of particular interest for our purposes, are the PACS and the PASCS having just one photon
added and one photon subtracted (k = l = 1). Thus, from an initial coherent state |α〉, we first add
one photon to it, or |φA〉 ∝ aˆ†|α〉 and then subtract one photon from the resulting state, obtaining the
PASCS |1, 1, α〉 ≡∝ aˆ|φA〉. An interesting feature of the state |1, 1, α〉 is that it may be written as a
superposition of a coherent state and a photon added coherent state (PACS), i.e. |1, 1, α〉 ∝ aˆaˆ†|α〉 ∝
(1 + aˆ†aˆ)|α〉 ∝ |α〉+ α|φA〉. In other words, this specific PASCS may be written as a superposition of a
Gaussian state (coherent state) with a non-Gaussian component (PACS) weighted by α.
A useful and well known representation of the field states is the Wigner function - a quasiprob-
ability distribution in phase space [26, 27]. For a density operator ρˆ, the Wigner function may be written
as:
W (ζ) =
2
pi
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n〈n|Dˆ−1(ζ)ρˆDˆ(ζ)|n〉, (3)
where ζ = ζr + iζi, being (ζr, ζi) the phase space coordinates, and Dˆ is Glauber’s displacement operator,
Dˆ(ζ) = exp(ζaˆ† − ζ∗aˆ). For the PASCS, ρˆ = |k, l, α〉〈k, l, α|, the corresponding Wigner function reads
[25]
W k,l(ζ;α) =
2e(−2|α−ζ|
2)
piNk,l(α)
k∑
n=0
(−1)n(k!)2
n!((k − n)!)2 |Hk−n,l(i(2ζ − α), iα
∗)|2, (4)
being H the bivariate Hermite polynomials
Hp,q(, ε) =
min(p,q)∑
r=0
(−1)rp!q!
r!(p− r)!(q − r)!
p−rεq−r. (5)
For comparison, we have plotted in Figure 1 the Wigner function of the PASCS having just one
photon added and one photon subtracted [equation (4) with k = l = 1], together with the Wigner function
of the coherent state |α〉, given by W (ζ;α) = 2pi exp(−2|α− ζ|2). The Wigner function of a coherent state
is exactly a Gaussian function, while the PASCS’s Wigner function has a slight deformation as well as a
2
negative part, a clear indication of the nonclassicality of the state. Apart from being useful for identifying
some features of quantum states, the Wigner function may also be used to analyse the security of our
protocol, as we are going to show below.
3 The Protocol
The protocol works as follows: firstly, Alice randomly chooses one of the four PASCS (for α real): either
|ψAS+〉 ≡ |1, 1, α〉 and |ψAS+i〉 ≡ |1, 1, iα〉 (representing bit 1), or |ψAS−〉 ≡ |1, 1,−α〉 and |ψAS−i〉 ≡
|1, 1,−iα〉, (representing bit 0) in the horizontal and vertical bases, respectively. The plots of the Wigner
functions corresponding to |ψAS−〉 and |ψAS+〉 in Figure 2 give a clear picture of their distinguishability
in phase space. In a second step Alice sends a light signal prepared in the chosen state to Bob, who
randomly selects either the horizontal or the vertical basis and performs a homodyne detection on the
received signal. Bob also fixes a convenient value for the post-selection threshold, βc. We now denote
β = βr + iβi the (complex) measurement variable corresponding to Bob’s measurement. If in a given
measurement, he finds βr,i < −βc, Bob assigns value 0 the bit; if he finds βr,i > βc, he assigns value 1 to
the bit. Otherwise, Bob tells Alice to neglect the corresponding bit.
4 Beam-splitter attack: Superior channel attack
Due to the transmission line losses (imperfect channel), it is possible for an eavesdropper (Eve) to intercept
a fraction of the signal without being noticed by the legitimate users. To do that, Eve uses an asymmetric
beam-splitter of transmissivity T and reflectivity R, with T 2 +R2 = 1. She keeps the reflected part of the
beam (the transmitted part is sent to Bob via a lossless channel) stored in a quantum memory and waits
for the announcement of the measurement basis used by Bob. For simplicity, in this security analysis we
consider just the case in which the horizontal basis is announced, as the discussion is analogous for the
vertical basis due to symmetry. To estimate the amount of gain of secret information per transmitted
pulse SAB it is necessary to derive an upper bound of the information leaked to Eve when she splits the
beam, as discussed in [21, 30]. A relevant quantity in the following derivation is the joint measurement
probability, of Bob obtaining the result βr and Eve obtaining r,
P±(βr, r) =
∫
W˜±(β, )dβidi, (6)
where W˜±(β, ) is the (two-mode) Wigner function of the beam-splitter output [8, 28, 29],
W˜±(β, ) = W
1,1
ψAS±(Tβ −R, α)Wvac(Rβ + T). (7)
The ± signs refer to the pair of states we are considering for the security analysis, namely |ψAS+〉 and
|ψAS−〉. In the expression above, W 1,1ψAS±(Tβ−R, α) is the (single mode) Wigner function [equation (4)]
of the PASCS resulting from the addition of only one photon to a coherent state α and subtraction of
one photon from the resulting state. In the other port of the beam splitter we have the vacuum as input
state, with Wigner function Wvac(Rβ + T).
Because the PASCS is not a coherent state, the two emerging beams from the beam-splitter
are normally in an entangled state. Thus, the joint probability distribution does not factorize, and the
results of measurements made by Bob, βr and Eve, r will be somehow correlated, as shown in Figure
3. This means that, if Bob measures a relatively large value for his quadrature (βr), Eve is likely to
measure a small value for hers (r). For instance, as seen in Figure 3: the maximum of P+(βr, r) occurs
for βr = 1.2, while r = −0.70. Thus, if we increase the value of the post-selection threshold, the bit
error rate on Eve’s side will also be increased.
After performing an ideal error correction and privacy amplification, we may obtain a lower
bound for the gain of secret information per transmitted pulse, SAB as discussed in [8, 21, 30, 31]. Firstly
we define racc, the fraction of accepted bits racc = [P (0) + P (1)]/2, with
P (1) =
∫ ∞
βc
P ′+(βr)dβr (8)
P (0) =
∫ −βc
−∞
P ′+(βr)dβr, (9)
3
and
P ′±(βr) =
∫
W˜±(β, )dβididr. (10)
The Shannon Information IAB is defined as
IAB =
∫ ∞
βc
dβr
P ′+(βr) + P
′
+(−βr)
P (0) + P (1)
(11)
× {1 + δ(βr) log2 δ(βr) + [1− δ(βr)] log2[1− δ(βr)]} ,
with
δ(βr) =
P ′+(−βr)
P ′+(βr) + P ′+(−βr)
. (12)
The amount of reduction of the raw key during the privacy amplification may be written as τ = 1 +
log2 (Pc), where Pc is the collision probability [8]
Pc =
1
2
∫ P2+ (r |βc <|βr|) + P2− (r |βc <|βr|)
P+ (r |βc <|βr|) + P− (r |βc <|βr|) dr, (13)
where
P± (r |βc <|βr|) =
∫
βc<|βr|
P± (βr, r)
P (0) + P (1)
dβr (14)
is Eve’s probability distribution conditioned to the fact that a pulse ± was sent and that Bob accepted
the bit in his post-selection. The collision probability plays a crucial role in the generation of the secret
key, indicating by which amount the raw key must be reduced in order to eliminate Eve’s knowledge
about it. The secret information SAB is thus given by
SAB = racc (IAB − τ) . (15)
The results are shown in Figure 4. We have that the maximum of the surface representing the secret
information is SmaxAB ≈ 0.140 for the coherent state while SmaxAB ≈ 0.167 for the PASCS. i.e., a percent
improvement of about 19% if the PASCS are used in place of coherent states. Moreover, we note that the
PASCS based protocol is more efficient for smaller values of the amplitude α of the transmitted pulse,
compared to the coherent state case, as seen in Figure 4. We remind that the PASCS (having just one
photon added and one photon subtracted) may be written as a superposition of the coherent state |α〉
with a PACS, or |ψAS〉 ∝ |α〉 + α|φA〉; thus, for small α the contribution of the PACS (non-Gaussian
state) will also be very small, and the PASCS will be close to a coherent (Gaussian) state. Nevertheless, it
will still generate an entangled state after crossing the beam splitter. This will introduce anti-correlations
between Bob’s and Eve’s measurements results (see Figure 3), which favours the security of the PASCS-
based protocol, given that Bob will be able to reduce Eve’s knowledge about the bits via post- selection.
In Figure 5 we have plotted the secret bit rate SAB as a function of transmission distance in a standard
optical fibre for protocols using PASCS and coherent states. We note that a PASCS-based protocol
outperforms a protocol based solely on coherent states, in the sense that a secret key could be generated
at higher rates for a given distance.
5 Intercept-resend attack: Simultaneous quadrature measure-
ment attack
For complementarity, we discuss now a second (intercept-resend) attack performed by Eve in which
she splits the incoming pulses of light in a 50:50 beam-splitter and performs simultaneous quadrature
measurements on the outgoing beams. She then tries to infer (with probability Pcorr) the state of the
signal sent by Alice. Here we consider the preparation of four possible states by Alice, defined above
as |ψAS±(i)〉. If Eve measures (βr, εi), she will choose the state of the signal for which the associated
joint probability distribution P±(i) is maximum. For each state we have a corresponding region in phase
space (each one of area A0), i.e., βr ≥ |εi| for |ψAS+〉; εi > |βr| for |ψAS+i〉; −βr ≥ |εi| for |ψAS−〉 and
−εi > |βr| for |ψAS−i〉. Generally speaking, the associated probability distributions are given by
P±(i)(βr, i) =
∫
W˜±(i)(β, )dβidr, (16)
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where W˜±(β, ) is the (two-mode) Wigner function of the beam-splitter output,
W˜±(i)(β, ) = W
1,1
ψAS±(i)
(Tβ −R, α) ∗Wvac(Rβ + T). (17)
As in reference [8] we may define Eve’s success rate for the attack, Pcorr. For instance, for a signal in the
state |ψAS+〉, we have
Pcorr = 2
∫
A0
P+(βr, i)dβrdi. (18)
The efficiency of such an attack may then be evaluated. Alice can make an optimization of the coherent
amplitude α given a fixed error rate δ = 1.15×10−3 for a lossless line and without the presence of Eve. In
Figure 6 we have the optimum α and the fraction of accepted bits, racc as a function of the post-selection
threshold βc, for both coherent state and the PASCS. We note that the value of optimum α (for each
βc) is in general smaller in the PASCS based protocol, compared to the coherent state case. Thus, even
though the rate of accepted bits are smaller for the PASCS, the probability of Eve obtaining the correct
bit becomes also smaller in this case, given that the optimum value of α (for a given value of threshold
βc) is smaller for the PASCS. In Figure 7 we have a plot of Pcorr as a function of βc, which clearly shows
the advantage of the PASCS over coherent states concerning the simultaneous quadrature measurement
attack.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that a continuous-variable protocol based on PASCS having just one photon added
and one photon subtracted is more efficient than a coherent state-based protocol, both of them using
homodyne detection and post-selection as well as similar amplitudes for the coherent states employed. We
have performed a security analysis based on the superior channel attack, and concluded that the PASCS-
based protocol would allow the legitimate users (Alice and Bob) to build a secret key with transmission
rates higher than the ones obtained from coherent state based protocols. We have also analyzed the
simultaneous quadrature measurement attack, and we have shown that Eve’s success rate is smaller if
PASCS are used in the place of coherent states. We would like to remark that this work is an attempt
to explore the possibilities of utilization of non-Gaussian states for quantum key distribution purposes,
and this may open up new directions for continuous-variable protocols. We believe that implementations
based on states such as the PASCS could be considered as viable alternatives.
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Figure 1: Wigner Function and Contour Plots of: PASCS (left) with one photon added and one photon
subtracted from a coherent state having α = 1 and a Coherent State (right) having α′ = 1.5.
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Figure 2: Contour plots of the PASCS with one photon added and one photon subtracted from a coherent
state having α = 0.55, (|ψAS+〉) and α = −0.55 (|ψAS−〉).
Figure 3: Contour plot of the joint probability distribution, P+(βr, r), for α = 1 and T
2 = 0.75.
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Figure 4: Secret key rate SAB versus the coherent state amplitude (α) and the post-selection threshold
(βc) for a coherent state (left) and for a PASCS having just one photon added and one photon subtracted
(right). The channel transmission is T 2 = 0.75.
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Figure 5: Secret key rate SAB versus distance for the: PASCS (solid line) and the coherent state (dashed
line). We have considered an optical fiber loss coefficient 0.2 dB/km for a wavelength of 1.22µm.
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Figure 6: Optimum α as a function of βc, for the PASCS (solid blue line) and coherent state (dashed
blue line); fraction of accepted bits, racc as a function of the post-selection threshold βc, for the PASCS
(solid red line) and coherent state (dashed red line)
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Figure 7: The rate of Eve’s success Pcorr as a function of βc, PASCS (solid line) and coherent state
(dashed line).
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